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FORUM 
SUSPECTED UNAPPROVED PARTS IN THE A l454 TION INDUSTRY: 
CONSIDERA TION OF SYSTEM SAFETY AIM) CONTROL 
Steven J. Sletten 
It is well known and highly touted that there is a historically high level of safety in U.S. air transportation. The 
American traveling public has come to expect this level of safety in the skies. Key elements in maintaining this high 
level of air safety are specific federal regulations, along with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) surveillance, 
inspection, and enforcement activities. The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations include a framework of rules governing 
the design, manufacture, and use of aviation products and parts. The rules are in place to assist the aviation industry 
in maintaining its excellent safety record, and serve as a means to prevent unwanted or suspected deficient parts from 
being used on aircraft. 
In the early 1990s the FAA increased efforts to educate 
the public and its own inspectors regarding the potential 
safety threat posed by aeronautical parts that do not meet 
applicable design, manufacture, and maintenance 
requirements. In 1993, the FAA established the Suspected 
Unapproved Parts (SUP) Program to coordinate FAA 
efforts to minimize safety risks posed by the entry of 
"unapproved" parts into the U.S. aviation inventory and 
their installation on aircraft (Dept. of Transportation, 
1995). 
Even though the SUP Program was put in place, there 
was still concern within Congress, the Department of 
Transportation Office of the Inspector General (OIG), the 
public, and the FAA itselfthat the FAA's plan to regulation 
and monitoring aviation parts and enforcing the regulations 
was not comprehensive enough. The underlying concern 
was whether all parts installed on aircraft during preventive 
maintenance, routine maintenance, and alteration met all 
the necessary FAA requirements (Dept. of Transportation, 
1995). If they did not, then safety may be compromised, 
and the degree in which the public's safety is potentially in 
peril is still up for debate. 
The aircraft parts sales market is a $45 billion a year 
industry, with growth occurring on a seemingly annual 
basis (Paige, 1999). Obviously, with so much money at 
stake, all types of people and companies attempt to get in 
the aircraft parts business as distributors and brokers. Some 
of these individuals are highly qualified, others are not. 
This is an area that the FAA has had difficulty in 
regulating, and where a breakdown in system safety 
processes often occurs. Greed is a strong force, and 
unscrupulous people are willing to sell aircraft parts that 
are knowingly not airworthy. These are unapproved aircraft 
parts that can be a critical component to aviation safety. 
Often, the reason why these parts are unapproved or 
"bgbo~~ is because they are old parts that have been altered 
to look like new. Suspected unapproved parts (SUPS), now 
a euphemism for what was typically called '%ogus parts", 
includes everything fiom totally counterfeit parts, to 
outdated parts passed of as new, to otherwise airworthy 
parts that somehow have been separated from their 
certification paper trail or are not manufactured according 
to FAA specifications (Paige, 1999). Any aircraft part that 
does not have the proper identification paperwork 
accompanying it is considered a suspected unapproved part, 
and should not be installed in an aircraft until proper 
testing is conducted. 
Even parts that do have accompanying paperwork are 
suspect because inconsistencies in the information provided 
on the certificates leads to questioning the part's 
authenticity. The SUPS problem that the aviation industry 
currently hces is really brought on by the very nature of the 
industry itself. The control mechanisms that supposedly 
were there to prevent parts from getting back into the repair 
system were not heavily enforced by the FAA (Purdue 
University, 1995). Also, the air carriers' ability to sell parts 
back to brokers, or to scrap yards poses yet another 
problem, because these discarded parts are then re-sold 
back into the system (Dept. of Transportation, 1994). 
Differing views exist concerning how significant the SUP 
threat may be to the aviation industry. One area that all will 
agree upon is that SUPS do exist, and have infiltrated into 
the aviation industry at manufacturing and maintenance 
facilities all across the country. The aviation industry as a 
whole has to come to grips with this issue. Although 
mechanisms have been put into place to prevent 
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unapproved parts fiom being used, there is still more that 
can be done. This paper will examine some of the issues 
regarding suspected unapproved parts (SUPS) in the 
aviation industry, and explore how system safety may be 
compromised, regardless of how the regulations currently 
in place are implemented. 
Discassion 
One of the interesting difficulties with the concept of 
suspected unapproved parts in the aviation industry deals 
with the &ifking views and approaches oftwo Department 
of Transportation government offices. Principally, this 
difference of viewpoints revolves around the FAA and the 
Office ofthe Inspector General (OIG). The FAA has stated 
a position that unapproved parts do not pose a significant 
safety threat to the air transportation system. They cite the 
fact that the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
has indicated that not one commercial airliner accident in 
the United States has occurred due to unapproved parts 
(Purdue University, 1995). This is not to say that incidents 
have not occurred due to unapproved parts, but there is a 
distinction between aircraft "incidents" versus "accidents" 
in the lexicon of the aviation regulatory community. This 
distinction provides a justification by the FAA not to 
establish a high regulatory emphasis or funding on the 
suspected unapproved parts issue, at least to the level that 
the OIG would like to see (Purdue University, 1995). 
On the other hand, the Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) believes that unapproved parts, and even suspected 
unapproved parts, do pose a significant safety issue to the 
U.S. air transportation system (Purdue University, 1995). 
Not until relatively recently have aircraft parts been 
examined in such detail to determine how they serve as a 
''weak link" in the aviation safety chain. The OIG approach 
is that SUPS should be deserving of the same regulatory 
scrutiny as other air transportation safety issues such as 
weapons screening or crew resource management training. 
Because there is a contrast in opinion between these two 
government agencies, with the FAA seeming to believe that 
the OIG's office is on some sort of crusade, the two 
government bodies have not always cooperated in the most 
productive way. Management has not been jointly 
communicating with each other, influencing a system 
program implementation. The lack of any FAA regulatory 
'%bite9' has also allowed for aviation parts brokers and 
distributors to essentially have a fiee reign of the market 
place with out fear of retribution. 
The civil and criminal penalties are also relatively light 
considering the number of deaths that could occur if a 
catastrophic parts failure took place in an airborne jetliner. 
In fairness to the FAA, there are regulations in place 
regarding specifications required by the machine shops that 
manufacture aircraft parts, and the FAA certificate for 
these manufacturing operations allows standards to be 
recognized and set. Within the aviation industry, it is very 
important that parts have the proper FAA certifLing 
paperwork accompanying them. It is this industry's "good 
house keeping seal" standard that is sought to determine if 
a part is airworthy. This allows all people buying and 
utilizing a particular part to have some assurance that the 
part is authentic and has met certain engineering criteria 
regarding part integrity and quality. However, like other 
certification programs, there are ways to circumvent the 
system and make products, and their associated paperwork, 
appear to be authentic to the untrained eye. 
Herein lies a problem for the aviation industry when parts 
are bought and sold that carry certifying paperwork that has 
been forged or counterfeited. If an aircraft part does not 
have paperwork accompanying it, it is suspect, and 
therefore would be considered unapproved. From a systems 
safety perspective, there are mechanisms in place to control 
suspected unapproved parts flom entering the system, but 
there are also gaps in the system that exist. Until these 
procedural voids are rectified, there is more of a likelihood 
that suspected unapproved parts will continue to enter the 
aviation industry, and be installed on aircraft. 
In this information age and use of computer chip 
technology, there are new ways for parts to be ordered, and 
inventoried, such as on a computer data base. Companies 
such as Boeing sell a multitude of aircraft parts on their 
web page daily (AW&ST, 2000). Boeing has even granted 
exclusive distribution rights to another company for its 
surplus commercial aircraft parts supply. This will 
primarily be for Boeing's out-of-production transports, and 
will involve a global sales force and responsibility for next 
day shipping and warranty processes (AW&ST, 1999). 
Airlines place 4,000 orders daily over the Internet for spare 
parts, cutting the average pre-Internet delivery times of 
about a week to one day ("Control of the Supply Chain is 
Shifting, 1999). This example of business-tebusiness 
cybertrade brings about its own set ofsecurity control issues 
to contend with, that will unfortunately still allow for SUPS 
to exist. For example, a small parts manufacture can now 
get on-line and offer customized aircraft parts products at 
lower prices than some ofthe larger, more established parts 
enterprises. Ifthe intentions of such a small parts firm were 
devious, then SUPS could enter the system. The members 
of the aviation industry, especially the airlines, have 
become more savvy, however, in the realization that if a 
part is priced at a very low cost, then there is a high 
probability that is authenticity is in question (Purdue 
University, 1995). Also, with formal procedures now in 
place for reporting suspected unapproved parts, the 
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less-than-honest parts broker is often singled out in the 
industry so they will not be used. Additionally, as the 
number of vendors is being reduced through consolidation, 
the mom-and-pop businesses havea harder time competing. 
The airlines are more reluctant to trust their business to a 
mom-and-pop operation. In the past few years, several 
major carriers have reduced their supplier base fiom as 
many as 50 vendors down to a core group of 5 to 10 
(Nelms, 1998). This, however, is not a guarantee that bogus 
or unapproved parts will not trade hands. 
A goal aspired to in the aviation industry is to attempt to 
place a seal or stamp of approval on every aircraft part 
(Purdue University, 1995). Many aircraft parts are too 
small to physically have a traditional stamp or seal placed 
on them. Often this stamp or seal would is placed on the 
box and/or paperwork that accompanies a part. 
Opportunities exist for parts to be switched. With the new 
use of computer chip technology, there is an effort 
underway to place a electronic chip on each part so that the 
part can be scanned and pertinent data retrieved (Nelms, 
1998). This would help eliminate fbrgery of paperwork, 
which has existed for many years in the industry. One of 
the ways in which a mechanic or engineer distinguishes 
between a bogus part and the real thing is to look for a 
trademark. If someone does not bother to place a trademark 
on his or her product, it raises suspicion that they may not 
be proud of their work. In the past, manufacturers had an 
excuse for not putting trademarks on really small parts. It 
used to be very difficult, but today there is equipment 
capable of making engravings so small you need a 
microscope to see them ("Dealing with Bogus Plastic 
Parts....", 1998). These electronic chip and trademark 
concepts are areas that FAA could consider implementing, 
but of course cost is an important consideration that could 
slow down any implementation of such a new identifying 
system process. 
While there is not a "silver bullet" to close the door on 
the counterfeit spare parts issue, or resolve the problem of 
airworthy, but unapproved parts, a major step in that 
direction is the FAA's release of Advisory Circular 21- 
229B that outlines procedures for detecting and reporting 
suspected unapproved parts (Nelms, 1998). This advisory 
circular is a step in the right direction, but to some, it does 
not go k enough in stopping parts distribution fiaud. This 
document is only guidance, not regulation, so it is a 
voluntary, not mandatory, notification process to the FAA. 
Not all cases will be properly reported, and tighter controls 
will not be kept. To date, the reported cases of SUPS is 
relatively low, yet this is misleading, because one case may 
have 100,000 parts involved with it. The FAA has 
established regulation requiring that specific certification 
procedures for product and parts manufactures be required. 
These certificates include the production certificate (PC), 
parts manufacturing approval (PMA), technical standard 
order (TSO), and production approval holders (PAH). 
Supporting parts documentation will indicate that by the 
use of such certificates, a part is traceable to an FAA- 
approved source (Dept. of Transportation, 1998). 
The issue of parts traceability will be one of the new 
challenges the industry will face. The FAA is cracking 
down on the traceability issue. Thoroughly traceable parts 
lead to quality material, but as noted earlier will also result 
in high cost, and high-tech equipment. This could put a lot 
of smaller firms out of business and the cost of such efforts 
could be borne by the traveling public. After 2000 there 
will be major fleet changes, with newer equipment coming 
on-line and supply of spares for aircraft in use drymg up. 
Older equipment will not be in demand and carries are 
dumping, rather than selling, older equipment and their 
spare parts ('Spare Parts in High Demand", 1998). 
The military is facing its own dilemma of the lack of 
spare parts. No one is making the parts anymore for the 
aging military fleet. As a stopgap measure, the military 
scavenges it own heaps of retired aircraft and cannibalizes 
their own equipment (Freeberg, 1999). Some of the parts 
off ofmilitary equipment make it onto commercial aircraft. 
Many of these part have civilian and commercial aircraft 
applications as well, and as military hardware ages to 
historically high levels, these parts are in demand by parts 
brokers and distributors (Freeberg, 1999). 
Analvsis 
In looking at the system of spare parts in the aviation 
industry, one cannot help but notice the economic, supply 
and demand, nature ofthis industry niche. One also notices 
how easy it has been for suspected unapproved parts (SUPS) 
to be bought and sold, due to a lack of regulatory oversight 
and severe penalties involved. Since the mid- 1990s, there 
has been a goad deal of effort taken to try and reduce SUPs 
from the marketplace. It appears that the battle is being 
one, but as the cliche goes, the war is not over. All of this 
effort, however, would not have come to the forefront 
without the vocal and legal efforts from people in positions 
of authority to speak out about such aviation safety 
concerns. The issue as to the significance of safety exists 
because the threat of SUPs still remains. The FAA states 
that safety is not significantly compromised, yet official 
guidelines regarding safety parameters and standards have 
not been presented by the FAA (Purdue University, 1995). 
This is a level of risk assessment that will have to be 
weighed. The process by which the results of risk analysis 
are used to make decisions is an important part of the 
system safety process. Perhaps, as part of the solution, a 
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risk assessment matrix could be developed based on the 
types of aircraft parts used. This matrix would then suggest 
criteria levels, and if they became unacceptable, then 
specific SUPS would be held to higher risk standards than 
others (Dept. of Defense, 1997). The level of operational 
criticality of each of the thousands of aircraft part in 
airplanes do not pose the same threat to safety. A piece of 
equipment may malfunction during flight, but then be 
properly repaired at the conclusion of the flight, without 
incident, or alarm Categorization of parts may be based on 
severity, since not all SUPS hazards are of equal magnitude 
to personal safety (Dept. of Defense, 1997). If the FAA and 
the aviation industry can not stop suspected unapproved 
parts fiom entering the system completely, then at least 
there could be very tight controls and demands place on a 
certain type and percentage of parts used in aircraft (e.g. 
fan blade parts, brake systems). The focus here would be on 
a determined type and percentage of parts, not all of them. 
This is a point of consideration that the government and 
lawmakers could deliberate further, and eventually could be 
a catalyst to help promote total SUPS elimination. 
If it remains easy for a scrap dealer to sell aircraft parts 
off the lot with no fear of retribution, then the SUP, or 
bogus, parts problem is going to persist. There is always a 
customer wanting to make a deal, especially if it is an 
airline in an economically depressed situation. Not until the 
FAA and other law enforcement agencies work effectively 
together to catch people conducting this type of selling 
activity will it curb the fiaudulent brokers and distributors 
fiom making an "easy buck". System safety programs 
encounter communication breakdowns, andthe fiction that 
exists in this circumstance between the FAA and OIG is 
perpetuating a chronic communications gap that must be 
closed. Sadly, lack of communication and loss of 
information are age-old concerns for most organizations, 
even if they are not separate ones, bymg to work together 
(Stephenson, 1991). Safety is a line responsibility that 
requires everyone to "be on the same page", and work 
effectively together throughout the entire structure. This is 
not happening with the FAA and the OIG in the manner 
that it should be. Too much time and effort seems to be 
wasted on internal bickering, issue formalities, and turf 
battles. We as citizens of the United States do not need 
government organizations of this stature "spinning their 
wheels", and delaying effective efforts to resolve a problem, 
regardless of how significant or insignificant one may 
believe it is. The key here is that a problem does exist, and 
safety is influenced by it. The FAA is an agency with the 
utmost concern for aviation safety priorities. This agency 
needs to provide the staff support necessary to ensure that 
the line organization is able to do its job well (Stephenson, 
1991). Interagency cooperation, beyond the Office of 
Inspector General (OIG) is an must for reduction in SUPS 
in the aviation system. Initial and ongoing training for all 
individuals involved in stopping SUPS use is an important 
aspect of good safety pradice beginning as fiu upstream as 
possible. This can also help reduce the amount of money 
spent on areas such as the SUP enforcement and control 
issue (Stephenson, 1991). Safety is achieved by doing 
things right the first time. The OIG would contend that the 
FAA has not taken this approach. One wuld assess that the 
system safety effort to repair the SUPS condition as it 
currently exists is more difficult because it is not a fist 
time operation. The parts distribution process is one that 
has developed over time, and system safety controls could 
not ideally be laid out at the infancy of the SUPS 
distribution process. The system safety effort should begin 
when the project begins and continue through the life cycle 
(Stephenson, 199 1). 
It is true that a major airline accident has not occurred in 
the United States due to SUPS being used. However, there 
have been other events such as a 1989 Norwegian charter 
flight that crashed and killed 55 people after a tail section 
fastened with unapproved parts tore loose. And, a near 
catastrophe occurred in June 1995, in Atlanta, when the 
engine of a Valdet DC-9 exploded on takeog hurling , 
shrapnel through the fuselage, causing a cabin fire, and ; 
injuring passengers. Investigators found the failure 
occurred in a replacement part overhauled at a non-FAA 
approved repair station in Turkey (Paige, 1999). The SUP 
issue is certainly global in nature, and has come close to 
directing its influence on American soil. 
Incidents, and not accidents, (there is a distinction in 
FAA terminology) have occurred in the United States, but 
perhaps it is only a matter of time before a SUP is a cause 
of a major accident. Perhaps it already has been, but with 
millions of parts strewn all over the ground, the cause of 
some horrific crashes will never be known. As noted 
earlier, not every park ofan aircraft is a critical one, and not 
all unapproved parts pose the same threat to safety. 
However, if people knew that less than standard (i.e., FAA- 
approved) parts were involved in the construction of the 
aircraft that they were on, then the might have second 
thoughts regarding operational safety. Having an imitation 
may work well for a fake Rolex watch one buys fiom a local 
street vendor, but few passengers may be willing to accept 
the same analogy with the parts operating the engines, or 
critical flight controls, of a commercial airliner they are 
flying in. 
The area of SUP and spare parts in general is huge in the 
aviation industry. One gets the sense though that the entire 
concept of aircraft maintenance and spare parts is 
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undergoing major changes fiom the way it had been for 
many years. The aircraft maintenance industry is going 
through a evolution of sorts, and the FAA, OIG, and 
Congress are pushing concepts that are changing the way 
people think about maintenance, and the kind of 
commitments that are made to their capital and business 
operations. They are in essence providing additional safety 
and warning devices that will deter the use of unapproved 
parts for being installed on aircraft (Stephenson, 1991). 
With the advancement of technology and better ways of 
record keeping, improved controls are being considered and 
applied to the aviation parts industry. A safety precedence 
sequence is taking form that offers such controls and 
warning devices to improve the design of the parts 
inventory system (Stephenson, 199 1). The establishment of 
the Suspected Unapproved Parts Program has gone along 
way to help develop a safety precedence, and get a sequence 
in place. The aviation industry as a whole should analyze 
itself even more closely regarding the SUP issue, by 
conducting a operating and support hazard analysis. The 
importance of this process is that it helps integrate the 
people and procedures into the system, so that weak or 
deficient areas can be address (Stephenson, 1991). 
Government agencies and people working together requires 
more improvement in the battle against SUPS. A complete 
project evaluation tree may be used to perform such an 
analysis on the current aviation industry SUP reduction 
system (Stephenson, 1991). A detailed review of the 
procedures, personnel, and tools to accomplish this safety 
task is the kind of rude awakening the FAA and the 
aviation industry needs to determine gaps, or weak links, in 
the SUPS distribution system. 
Conclusion 
We all take risks in our lives, and for the most part, we 
all try to reduce them when given the chance. As noted in 
the beginning of this paper, air travel in the United States 
is very safe. It has existed this way with the use of 
suspected unapproved parts (SUPS), so why should there be 
a concern that air travel will suddenly become a lot more 
dangerous now that we know SUPS are being installed? 
Some of this revolves around the issue of common sense, 
and some of it about looking analytically at a system 
process and noting that the system process has a potential 
for critical, or even catastrophic, hilure due to SUPS. The 
words critical and catastrophic are extreme descriptions for 
hazard severity, so it is worth taking notice, and that is 
what the aviation industry has done. Risk assessment 
description of both severity and probability categories are 
taken into account in the approach to system safety 
(Stephenson, 199 1). Safety is a productive concept and 
introducing parts that do not fit industry established 
specifications is non-productive. This has the makings of a 
classic case of an upstream effort to eliminate the SUPS 
fiom the manuhchuing system and use people, technology, 
and techniques to help accomplish this. 
We rely on our government to uphold safety standards, 
and in some eyes, they have hiled at this. Perhaps 
government can use the resources of the private sector to 
help accomplish safety goals and set parts manufacturing 
standards. In recent times, other parts of the federal 
government have emulated private sector approaches to 
reduce cost and increase efficiency. Multinational 
organizations such as the International AntiCouterfeiting 
Organization (IACC) both initiates actions and supports 
government actions that will ultimately result in increased 
enforcement, lead to the proseation of intellectual property 
infiinges, and create a strong deterrent to counterfeiters and 
pirates (IACC, 2000). These organizations can provide 
assistance to the FAA and law enforcement agencies. 
Federal investigators do a lot to curb fraudulent parts 
activities, but as the views of the OIG have expressed, not 
enough is being done. Business and industry have a vested 
interest in making sure that the services they provide are 
done correctly and safely. The aviation industry is no 
exception. With the FAA being more reactive than 
proactive, a good hard analytical review of SUPS in the 
manufacturing system must be done. In many respects this 
is happening, but one may consider if it is fast enough to 
prevent a SUP fiom causing an air disaster. For such an 
important issue as aviation safety, is does seem unusual that 
elements such as counterfeit or unapproved parts could be 
so pervasive, for so long, in the system. Then again, it is an 
awesomely large system, so getting a handle on it poses a 
herculean challenge. This emphasizes the point that the 
FAA may not be able to do this with its own resources. 
Making FAA advisory circulars such as No. 21-29B 
mandatory, increasing civil and criminal penalties for 
counterfeiting, and developing an electronic scanning and 
data base for all in the aviation industry to use to know who 
has been involved with unapproved parts is all fine and 
good, but it does not go to the heart of the problem. The 
smartest of crooks will learn how to circumvent a system, 
and the areas just listed are not enough to deter individuals 
trying to make easy money dishonestly. It is up to the 
aviation industry to invest in the resources and control 
concepts, be it man or machine, to stop the excessive use of 
SUPS. However, like many things that are not right, 
throwing money at something is only a partial remedy. 
There are too many incorrect issues for our government to 
throw money at. 
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We as a society have to rate the risks involved with 
suspected unapproved parts (SUPS) use, and determine how 
much chance we want to take in air travel. If one portion of 
our government regulatory authority claims that SUPS do 
not pose any significant risk, then is this enough to satisfy 
the majority of our population? After all, the FAA is the 
expert in the aviation field. Much of this falls back on 
supply and demand economics, and the need for tight 
regulatory control to curb the use of SUPS. The key is to 
think creatively, and "out of the box" to fmd better ways to 
enforce such a problem as SUPs, and that helps to reduce 
the chance of harm in terms of severity and probability. 
From the work being done to date in aviation, it appears 
that this is in fkct taking place, and we can only collectively 
hope that aircraft accidents due to SUPS, or any other 
cause, will not occur. Nevertheless, relying on chance and 
playing the odds is not a foundation for a system safety 
approach. Control measures must be brought into place to 
significantly diminish the threat of SUPs installation on 
aircraft. The FAA, and other organizations, can take 
fiuther steps to plan, manage, and conduct a reliable system 
safety program so that SUPS are not as prevalent in the 
complex parts supply system. The hazards regarding SUPS 
have been identified, and the hdamental goal is to reduce 
the risks for the traveling public. 
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specialized in the area of hydrogeology as a government regulator and environmental consultant. 
REFERENCES 
Control of the supply chain is shifting. (1999, July). IIE Solutions, 3 l,7. 
Dealing with bogus plastic parts in the medical industry. (1998, January 5). Design News. 53,162. Department of 
Defense. (1997). Standard practice for svstem safety promam reauirements @OD Publication MIL-STD-882D). 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Ofice. 
Department of Transportation. (1994). Suspected unapproved parts. [Review of the Federal Aviation 
Administration video cassette program]. 
Department of Transportation. (1995). Swected 'una~~roved parts' promam plan (FAA Publication). 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Department of Transportation. (I 998). Detecting and reporting su-ed unapproved parts (FAA Publication AC 
No. 21-29B). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Freeberg, S.J. (1999, December 11). The military scrapes for spares. National Journal, 31,17. 
International Anticounterfeiting Coalition (February 2000). [On-line]. Available: http://www.ari.neff iaccl 
Paige, S. (1 999, Sept. 27). Air-parts pirates crash and burn. Insight on the News, 15, 13-1 5. 
Proctor, P. (1 999, May lo). Parts for older boeings. Aviation Week & Space Technologv. 150,17. 
Proctor, P. (2000, February 2 1). Industry outlook. Aviation Week & Space Technolow. 152,33. 
Purdue University Public Affiirs Video Archives (1 995). Unapproved airplane parts and air safety: Senate 
governmental affiirs subcommittee [Review of the video program United States Conmess. Senate. Governmental affiirs 
subcornmitteel. C-SPAN (Television network). 
Spare parts in high demand. (1998). Airhance Journal, 52-55. 
Stephenson, J. (1991). System safety two thousand. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Page 16 JAAER, Spring 2000 
6
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 9, No. 3 [2000], Art. 4
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol9/iss3/4
